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Summary. In the mid 1960s there were about 22 000 single-family leasehold homes in Honolulu.
Dissatisfaction with leasehold led to reform legislation in 1967, allowing lessees to buy leased
land. By 1991 less than 5000 lessees remained. This paper examines why landowners elected to
lease rather than sell land and attributes the rise of leasehold to legal constraints on land sales
by large estates, duties of estate trustees and the federal tax code. Ideological forces initiated land
reform in 1967, but rent-seeking forces captured the process in the mid 1970s. It is concluded that
Hawaii’s experiment with leasehold was a failure due to the dif® culties associated with specifying
and enforcing long-term contracts in residential land.
A man is not whole and complete
Unless he owns a house and the
ground it stands on.
(Walt Whitman)
In many parts of the world, residents own
their homes and lease the land on which their
homes are built. Residential land leasing is
practised in Great Britain, Israel, Hong
Kong, Singapore, New Delhi, Canberra, Am-
sterdam, Stockholm and Vancouver
(Canada). In most cases, a municipal govern-
ment leases publicly-owned land to residents
in a competitive land market (MacDonald,
1969). In the UK, the Church of England
owns large tracts of land which it leases to
home-owners. Residential land leasing is
also widely practised in many Paci® c island
countries where land cannot be sold to non-
natives.
1
Residential land leasing in the US is rela-
tively uncommon. There are pockets of resi-
dential leaseholds in Maryland, south-eastern
Pennsylvania and California. The largest of
these developments is in Irvine, California,
where, in the 1960s, the Irvine Company
developed several leasehold communities
(Nakamura, 1989). There are also small
pockets of leasehold homes on Indian reser-
vations and other federal lands across the
US. However, residential land leasing has
been widely practised only in the State of
Hawaii, and in particular on the island of
Oahu which is co-terminous with the City
and County of Honolulu (hereafter referred
to as Honolulu). Residential leaseholds did
not become a major factor in Honolulu until
after World War II.
2 In 1940, there were
fewer than 500 leases to owners of single-
family homes, but by 1967 single-family
homes on leased land comprised about 26 per
cent of the total stock of single-family
homes (see Vargha, 1964, for pre-war data,
and Economics Research Associates, 1969,
for post-war data). The ownership of these
leases was highly concentrated. In 1963 a
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charitable trust, the Bishop Estate, owned 33
per cent; an individual, Harold Castle, owned
29 per cent; and a non-charitable trust, the
Campbell Estate, owned 6 per cent (Vargha,
1964, p. 12).
3
In the mid 1960s, condominiums began to
be developed, some of them on leased land.
In July 1989 there were 69 969 condominium
units on leased land, comprising 60 per cent
of Honolulu’ s condominium stock. Owner-
ship of the condominium leases was far less
concentrated than ownership of the single-
family home leases. The Bishop Estate
owned approximately 20 per cent of the con-
dominium leases, with the remainder being
widely dispersed.
In the US, some analysts believe that land
leasing could make home-ownership more
accessible since land leasing reduces the
overall purchase price of the house-land
package and thereby decreases the minimum
required down payment.
4 Other scholars
(Archer, 1974; McDonald, 1969) have fur-
ther argued that leasehold housing arrange-
ments should be used more extensively
because leasing might lower the transactions
costs of future land redevelopment.
Yet, even as the supply of condominium
and single-family leaseholds was increasing
in Hawaii, there was a political movement to
dismantle the institution. Over the past 25
years legislative and judicial decisions have
resulted in massive conversion of single-fam-
ily homes from leasehold to fee-simple
tenure. Consequently, in 1994 there remains
no more than 4600 single-family leasehold
homes out of the approximately 28 000 that
were ever built (Locations Inc, 1992). And
although leasehold condominiums today out-
number fee-simple condominiums, the City
and County of Honolulu has passed legis-
lation (currently being reviewed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals) allowing owners of
leasehold condominiums to use the power of
eminent domain to purchase the lands on
which their condominiums are located. In
sum, Hawaii’s experiment with leasehold
housing on privately owned land has been a
failure. In this paper, the rise and fall of
residential single-family leasing in Hawaii is
explained. The analysis of Hawaii’s experi-
ence provides important lessons for jurisdic-
tions, landowners and housing developers
who might contemplate the development of
leasehold residential housing.
1. Structure of Residential Leasehold
Contracts in Hawaii
In Hawaii, residential ground-lease lengths
vary among different properties, but typically
have been set at 55 years (e.g. the standard
Bishop Estate lease) with an option to obtain
a new 55-year lease from the date of sub-
sequent resale for homes sold within the ® rst
20 years of the lease for the purpose of
obtaining a new mortgage loan.
5 Land rent
usually has been speci® ed as an annual ® xed
sum (paid semi-annually) for the ® rst 30
years, with the rent for the next 25 years
being determined by mutual agreement or
appraisal.
6 The long initial ® xed-rent period
was set to facilitate long-term mortgage
® nancing by the FHA and other lenders.
Recent leases have incorporated rents that
increase by ® xed amounts at speci® ed inter-
vals (typically 10 years or longer) during the
® rst 30 years. In some cases `below-market’
lease rents are set for the ® rst 30 years; in
exchange, the lessee pays more than the mar-
ket value of the house. Lessees may prefer
this arrangement, as the interest component
of repaying a larger home mortgage loan is
tax deductible while lease rents on residential
land are not.
At renegotiation, the lease speci® es that
lease rents are to be adjusted to `market
levels’. The new lease rent incorporates ex-
pectations of in¯ ation over the remaining
term of the lease in the same manner that a
® xed-rate mortgage incorporates expecta-
tions of in¯ ation. This means that the renego-
tiation lease rent will be `front loaded’, i.e. it
will exceed spot market rents initially and in
later years be less than spot market rents.
A 1975 state law constrains lease rent
renegotiations by placing a ceiling on lease-
hold rents at renegotiation (Hawaii Revised
Statutes 510; the original legislation was Act
185). The law limits renegotiated rents to 4URBAN LAND REFORM IN HAWAII 1001
per cent of the appraised value of the unen-
cumbered land.
7 It also speci® es that lease
rents can be renegotiated after the initial
® xed-rent period no more than once every 15
years.
8 The lease rent control law applies
only to single-family homes and does not
apply to leasehold condominiums.
A typical Bishop Estate lease in the early
1970s was based on terms negotiated with
the FHA in 1967. It speci® ed that the renego-
tiated lease rent ªshall be determined by
mutual agreement of Lessor and Lessee, or,
if they fail to reach such agreement at least
90 days before the commencement of said
period, by appraisal . . .º. The rent ªshall be
the product of the then prevailing rate of
return for similar lands (but not less than the
prime rate of interest in Hawaii) multiplied
by the then market value of the demised land
exclusive of improvements thereon . . . º.
The lease stipulates the selection of three
appraisers, one each by the lessor and lessee,
and the third by the two appraisers. The
appraisers determine the ªprevailing rate of
returnº and the ªmarket valueº of the land.
The decision of the appraisers, or a majority
of them, is ® nal and binding on both parties.
The cost of the appraisal is divided equally
between the two parties. The structure of
leases prepared by other landowners is also
based on the FHA model.
Most leases contain provisions restricting
lessees from making signi® cant improve-
ments without the consent of the lessor and
requiring lessees to maintain property to
reasonable standards. A buyer of an existing
single-family home or condominium may as-
sume the existing land lease, but mortgagors
usually will not issue a new mortgage on a
house or condominium located on leased
land that is less than 10 years from renegoti-
ation or expiration.
At the expiration of the lease, the lessee
has the option to remove his improvements
within 30 days; otherwise both land and im-
provements revert to the lessor (new provi-
sions apply at expiration for post-1975
leases: see section 2). Of course, in many
cases the two parties may decide, prior to
expiration, to renew their current relationship
by entering into a leasehold contract specify-
ing an initial rent, contract duration and rent
renegotiation provisions.
2. Why Leasehold Rather Than Fee
Simple?
Fee-simple tenure clearly offers a preferred
bundle of rights to leasehold tenure. Why,
then, would anyone want to buy leasehold
property? Fry and Mak (1984, pp. 534±535)
demonstrated that since the market price of a
leasehold property is less than the market
price of an identical fee-simple property, bor-
rowing-constrained households may prefer to
buy leasehold property instead of fee-simple
to obtain more housing. If this explanation is
important, widespread use of residential
leasehold contracts should be observed not
only in Hawaii but throughout the US. In-
stead, only limited use of leasehold on es-
tates in Maryland, Pennsylvania and
Southern California is observed.
If the demand-side explanation fails to
explain the presence of leasehold residential
land tenure in Hawaii, the answer must come
from the supply side. Why would landowners
prefer to lease rather than sell? One thread
linking leasehold across the US is that almost
all lessors are large landowning estates. For
example, in Irvine, California, the Irvine
Company developed its large landholdings
(the Irvine Ranch) as leasehold housing.
On Oahu, the largest private landowner
and lessor is the Bishop Estate. According to
the (most recent) 1964 statewide inventory,
the Bishop Estate owned 59 000 acres or 27
per cent of all privately owned land. The
Estate was established in 1884 under the will
of Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop. Her will
mandated that her land be held in a charitable
trust, and that the rents provide for the edu-
cation of Hawaiians.
9 It further speci® ed that
the ª. . . trustees shall not sell any real estate,
cattle ranches, or any other property,
but . . . continue to manage the same, unless
in their opinion sales may be necessary for
the establishment or maintenance of said
schools, or for the best interest of my estate.º
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Estate lands. Between 1912 and 1960 the
Estate indicated no preference for leasing
over selling fee lots for homes (Midkiff,
1961, pp. 24±25, 32). The number of lots
voluntarily sold (3356) actually exceeded the
number leased (3139).
The second-largest landowner on Oahu
was the Estate of James Campbell. His 1900
will contained a similar clause. It speci® ed
ª. . . that the Trustees and their successors
keep intact my estate and administer the
same under the name of `The Estate of James
Campbell’ . . . and that the realty thereof
shall be particularly and especially preserved
intact and shall be aliened only in the event,
and to the extent, that the obvious interest of
my estate shall so demand.º
Additional legal constraints on the ® ve
Bishop Estate trustees also help explain the
trustees’ reluctance to sell land. Several
scholars (Friedman, 1964; Blair and
Heggstad, 1978) have analysed the distinc-
tion between a caretaker trust and a dynamic
trust. A caretaker trust is usually a short-term
trust spanning one lifetime or less, estab-
lished to protect the interests of its
bene® ciaries. The Bishop Estate, like other
large land-holding estates in Hawaii, is a
dynastic trust. A dynastic trust is usually a
long-term trust whose purpose is primarily
the perpetuation of an estate. A dynastic trust
has two basic goals: to preserve the trust
principal; and to provide a reasonable in-
come for the income bene® ciaries. Applying
the `prudent man rule’, the courts have his-
torically placed higher priority on the preser-
vation of the trust principal in a dynastic
trust.
The prudent man rule sets forth the duties
of the trustees in making investment deci-
sions for the trust.
10 The prudent man rule
imposes three duties on the trustees: ªThe
trustee must exercise a reasonable degree of
care in selecting investments. He must exer-
cise a reasonable degree of skill in making
the selection and use the caution which a
prudent man would exercise . . .º. (Scott
(1967), as quoted in Blair and Heggestad,
1978, p. 87). Hawaii has followed the pru-
dent man rule throughout the 20th century.
11
In Hawaii, an alleged violation of the pru-
dent man rule provided the basis for a 1980
law suit in which Bishop Estate trustee Hung
Wo Ching sued fellow trustee Matsuo Tak-
abuki, chief negotiator in the purchase of the
Kawaiahao Plaza of® ce building in Hon-
olulu, accusing him of making a questionable
deal that pro® ted the developers of the build-
ing at the expense of the Estate (Honolulu
Advertiser, 14 May 1980, p. A-1; Honolulu
Star Bulletin, 24 February 1982, p. B-4). In
that trial, the investment analyst retained by
Ching testi® ed that the purchase was impru-
dently made. (Ching did not prevail in the
trial).
Thus the Bishop Estate trustee who recom-
mends an investment that proves to be a poor
investment is subjected to close examination
from the public and other trustees concerning
his adherence to the prudent man rule. If he
does not adhere to the rule, he is liable for all
losses stemming from the investments. His
entire personal wealth is at risk. The ® nancial
performance of the Bishop Estate is annually
reviewed by a court-appointed master whose
® ndings are often highlighted in the daily
newspapers. Operating in a ® shbowl environ-
ment, the decisions of the trustees are fre-
quently second-guessed by critics (see
Honolulu Advertiser, 9 August 1973, p. A-1;
7 March 1973, p. A-1; 21 July 1973; p. D-1;
Honolulu Star Bulletin, 17 July 1973, p. B-
7). Indeed, trustees have often publicly criti-
cised and, as indicated above, even sued each
other over allegedly imprudent ® nancial de-
cisions and investment (see Honolulu Adver-
tiser, 9 September 1961, p. A-1; 10 February
1982, p. D-10). The Estate has also been
sued by bene® ciaries for `imprudent’ land
sales (see Honolulu Advertiser, 18 December
1973, p. A-1; 20 March 1974, p. A-12). The
same trustee cannot, however, reap all the
gains for recommending highly pro® table in-
vestments, as his income is a very small
percentage of the Estate’s total revenues.
12
There is, therefore, a bias in the trustees’
decision-making toward avoiding losses on
particular projects rather than maximising the
return on the entire investment portfolio.URBAN LAND REFORM IN HAWAII 1003
Table 1. Tax status and tax liabilities
Dealer Non-dealer
(frequent seller) (infrequent seller)
Net revenues from land sales
taxed as capital gains or
Charitable ordinary income.
(Bishop Estate) No Taxes
Net revenues from land rental
taxed as ordinary income.
Net revenues from land sales
Non-charitable All net revenues taxed as taxed as capital gains.
(Harold Castle and ordinary income.
Campbell Estate) Net revenues from land rental
taxed as ordinary income.
We are persuaded that the law of dynastic
estates, applicable under the wills establish-
ing the Bishop and Campbell trusts, has been
an important factor encouraging conservative
investment, including land retention. Had the
estate trustees sold the land, they would have
had to manage the sales proceeds. Since res-
idential land represented only a small per-
centage of their land holdings, one could
argue that selling would have been bene® cial
to both estates in that it would have given
both land-rich but cash-poor estates more
diversi® ed asset portfolios. Managing
money, however, is fraught with its own
dif® culties. Given the provisions of the wills
advising against the sale of real estate and
the prudent man constraints, it was individu-
ally less risky for the trustees to hold on to
the land rather than to sell it.
There are, however, two good reasons why
we cannot rely exclusively on the dynastic
estate argument as an explanation of lease-
hold.
13 First, con® dence in the argument is
undermined by the Bishop Estate’s reliance
on selling as well as leasing home lots be-
tween 1912 and 1960. Secondly, the argu-
ment cannot explain why Harold Castle and
numerous other landowners not classi® able
as dynastic estates, or even as charitable
entities, leased their lands.
These considerations lead us to argue that
federal income taxes also created a strong
preference among landowners for leasing in-
stead of selling their land, especially after
1960. Taxes on revenues from the sale and
lease of land depended partly on Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) classi® cation of the
seller as charitable or non-charitable. A non-
charitable classi® cation implied higher tax
liabilities.
14 Among the largest lessors, the
Bishop Estate was classi® ed as charitable.
Two tax considerations weighed against
sale. The ® rst, applicable only to non-charita-
ble landowners, was the capital gains tax.
The Bishop Estate, due to its charitable
status, was exempt. It was levied at rates
between 25 and 35 per cent from 1945 to
1981. The tax was collected only when the
gains were realised, so it could be deferred
inde® nitely through leasing. Thus, the capital
gains tax tended to discourage sale, and lock
the landlords into leasing for income. The
inducement to lease was particularly effec-
tive in Hawaii because most of the estates
had held their land for such a long time and
at such high appreciation rates that essen-
tially the entire sale proceeds would qualify
as taxable capital gains.
15
Taxes on revenues from the sale or lease
of land also depended on IRS classi® cation
of the seller as a dealer or non-dealer (Table
1). A non-charitable landlord, as a dealer,
would have to pay taxes on revenues from
lands sales at the ordinary income tax rate
(between 70 and 91 per cent between 1945
and 1981) instead of the lower capital gainsSUMNER J. LA CROIX ET AL. 1004
tax rate. The charitable Bishop Estate, as a
dealer, would lose its exemption from all
taxes: rental income would be taxed at the
ordinary income tax rate and capital gains
would be taxed at either the capital gains or
ordinary income tax rate.
All large estates were non-dealers. Their
second tax consideration weighing against
the sale of land was their fear of re-
classi® cation as dealer. It deterred sale be-
cause the IRS tended to review the tax status
of landlords making frequent or large sales.
16
The greater the frequency and aggregate
value of sales, the greater was the likelihood
that the IRS would reclassify the seller as a
dealer. In a 1973 interview, estate trustee
Matsuo Takabuki summarised the rationale
behind the Bishop Estate’s reluctance to sell
land: ª[E]veryone of these [transactions] is
subject to the Internal Revenue approval. So
we have to be careful that we do not under
any circumstances do anything that ruins our
status as a tax exempt institution.º (Honolulu
Advertiser, 31 July 1973, p. I-A-13).
Evidence of land sale deterrence due to the
threat of dealer classi® cation can be found in
a 1950s shift in the Bishop Estate’s policy of
selling as well as leasing its land for residen-
tial use. In 1954 the Estate joined with a
developer to build homes and sell them on a
fee-simple basis.
17 When the IRS learned of
the sales, it warned the Estate that if such
sales continued, it would lose its tax-exempt
status.
18 In the years following this warning,
the Estate leased thousands of lots but made
only two voluntary sales of 790 leased fees
in 1972.
19 These conveyances were each ar-
ranged as single bulk transactions to avoid
dealer classi® cation.
Although the tax consequences of dealer
classi® cation were less severe for the non-
charitable estates, they were enough to deter
them from making frequent sales. Harold
Castle seldom voluntarily sold any of his
land before he died in 1967, and the Camp-
bell Estate made very few voluntary sales in
the 1950s and 1960s.
20 The Campbell Estate
paid capital gains taxes on these transactions.
Castle & Cooke, the third-largest landowner
in Honolulu, had a different experience with
the IRS. In the mid 1960s the corporation
sold an option to purchase 3500 acres, and
then paid capital gains taxes.
21 Subsequently,
the IRS audited and required payment of
taxes at an effective rate between the capital
gains rate and the 48 per cent corporate
income tax rate.
In view of the dynastic trust and tax avoid-
ance arguments, it is understandable why
such a large percentageÐ 26 per cent in
1967Ð of single-family residences were on
leased private land in Honolulu relative to
other US urban areas (Economic Research
Associates, 1969, pp. VI-9, 10). First, the
dynastic trust explanation is applicable to the
Bishop and Campbell Estates, which in 1964
owned 20 per cent of the land in Honolulu
(Horowitz and Finn, 1967, Table 30). They
also owned 42 per cent of the residential
leasehold lots in Honolulu (Vargha, 1964, p.
10). The authors are unaware of any other
urban area in the US where dynastic trusts
owned such a large fraction of the land suit-
able for residential use. Secondly, the IRS
threat of dealer classi® cation was applicable
only to large landowners because they alone
had large enough land holdings to engage in
frequent sales. In 1964 the Bishop and
Campbell Estates and Harold Castle owned
31 per cent of the land in Honolulu
(Horowitz and Finn, 1967, p. 84). They also
owned 68 per cent of the residential lease-
hold lots in Honolulu (Vargha, 1964, p. 10).
We are unaware of any other urban area in
the US where landowners vulnerable to
dealer classi® cation owned such a large frac-
tion of the land suitable for residential use.
Finally, many small non-charitable
landowners leased land for single-family
homes. Although such small landowners
were not threatened by dealer classi® cation,
they, like the large owners, were deterred
from selling by the capital gains tax. This
begs the question, why did small owners
lease (rather than sell) in Honolulu but not on
the mainland, where the same federal tax
laws applied? One possible answer is that,
due to the policies of the Bishop Estate and
the other large estates, home-buyers and
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and accepting of the leasehold contract. It
was relatively easy for the smaller landowner
to lease in emulation of the larger ones in
Honolulu.
There is one more plausible explanation
which is applicable to the Bishop Estate.
This argument is rooted in the history of
Native Hawaiians’ land alienation. In 1848, a
land reform programme, the Great Mahele,
mandated the swift conversion of traditional
land holdings into private property (La Croix
and Roumasset, 1990). In 1850 the law was
changed to allow foreigners to own land
(Kame `eleihiwa, 1992). Over the next 70
years, the original Native Hawaiian recipi-
ents of land in the Great MaheleÐthe
Crown, the government, the chiefs and the
common peopleÐsold, gave away, aban-
doned or otherwise lost their land. By 1919,
they owned only 6 per cent of the land in the
Territory. The Bishop Estate, which was es-
tablished to serve the educational needs of
the Native Hawaiians, owned another 9 per
cent.
In response to this history and the alleged
importance of land ownership as an anchor
for the preservation of Hawaiian culture, Na-
tive Hawaiian groups have over many years
opposed the further alienation of Hawaiian
lands. Of course, Princess Bishop’s will em-
phasised the importance of retaining owner-
ship of her Estate. The trustees’ commitment
to this goal (among others in the Princess’s
will) has been bolstered by their appreciation
of history and their desire for support rather
than criticism from these vocal Native
Hawaiian groups (see, for example, Sunday
Star Bulletin & Advertiser, 27 August 1978,
p. A-25; Honolulu Star Bulletin, 20 July
1973, p. A-12; 21 July 1973, p. A-12).
3. The Fall of Leasehold: Residential
Land Reform, 1967± 92
At the same time that leasehold housing was
being developed and sold, efforts were un-
derway in Hawaii’s legislature to break up
the large estates and thereby dismantle the
institution of leasehold housing. While the
number of owner-occupied detached lease-
hold homes reached a peak of approximately
22 000 units in the mid 1970s, by September
1991, remaining leaseholds numbered only
4600.
22 Leasehold constituted about 30 per
cent of the owner-occupied detached homes
in mid 1970s, but by 1991 it had fallen to 5
per cent of a larger housing stock. Four large
estatesÐBishop Estate (57.3 per cent),
Castle Estate (16.8 per cent), Robinson Es-
tate (9.5 per cent) and Campbell Estate (6.7
per cent)Ðaccounted for over 90 per cent of
all conversions (Locations Inc., 1992, p. 19).
3.1. History of Leasehold Decline
After World War II, many people in Hawaii
viewed concentrated land ownership as an
impediment to housing development. In
1945, Territorial Governor Ingram M. Stain-
back told the Legislature that:
The great land holding monopolies which
exist in this Territory have resulted, es-
pecially on Oahu, in an arti® cial shortage
and unhealthy increase in the value of
lands available for residencesÐso extreme
as to render impracticable any schedule for
adequate housing with private capital un-
less and until suf® cient lands at reasonable
prices for new buildings can be made
available. (Honolulu Star Bulletin, 23 Oc-
tober 1981, p. A-16)
As the number of leasehold residential units
increased, there was growing concern that
major landowners preferred to lease rather
than sell their lands for residential develop-
ments. From 1952 the Democratic Party plat-
form called for land reform to enable
home-owners to purchase the fee interests in
their residential lots. In 1963 Democrats
were able to push a bill through the State
House patterned after the Maryland Ground
Land Act. The bill provided home-owners
the opportunity to purchase the fee interests
under their homes after living on the proper-
ties for 5 years. Opposition to the bill came
from large landowners and trusts, and
Hawaiian groups who viewed the bill as a
threat to the Bishop Estate. The bill failed by
one vote to pass the State Senate (HorowitzSUMNER J. LA CROIX ET AL. 1006
and Meller, 1966). Finally, in 1967, when
some of the earliest ground leases were being
renegotiated, the Hawaii State Legislature
enacted a law which enabled single-family
residential home-owners leasing land to ac-
quire it in fee simple (HRS 516). In brief, the
Land Reform Act (LRA) states that upon the
petition of 50 per cent of the lessees (or 25
lessees, whichever is less) in a leasehold
housing tract, the Hawaii Housing Authority
(HHA) will condemn the land and resell
individual parcels to the lessees. (For a
chronology of the land reform measures af-
fecting single-family residences, see State of
Hawaii, 1982.)
The LRA’s provision for bulk condem-
nation was designed to obtain favourable tax
treatment of leasehold sales from the IRS.
The IRS did maintain the Bishop Estate’s
tax-exempt status and also allowed non-char-
itable landowners to choose between (a) pay-
ing taxes at the capital gains tax rate on
condemnation sales and (b) inde® nitely de-
ferring such taxes by rolling the gains over
into another investment. The IRS policies
towards sales by charitable and non-charita-
ble landowners were implemented sale-by-
sale, through post-sale audits, until 1978
when it provided a blanket ruling for the
Bishop Estate (Honolulu Advertiser, 18 July
1978, pp. A-1 and A-5).
The passage of the LRA was suf® cient to
stop all landowners except the Bishop Estate
from entering into new leasehold develop-
ment contracts. The Bishop Estate continued
to enter into such contracts until the mid
1980s. The ful® lment of these contracts
brought new leasehold homes onto the mar-
ket as late as 1991. One reason why the
Bishop Estate alone continued to enter into
leasehold development agreements is that the
Native Hawaiian community pressured the
trustees to refrain from selling the fee.
There were few conversions from lease-
hold to fee simple between 1967 and 1975,
partly due to the unwillingness of Governor
Burns to implement the LRA. In 1975 the
Legislature passed Act 186 which corrected a
defect in the 1967 law as well as reaf® rming
its goals.
23 The LRA (as amended) was ® rst
employed in 1976. This was followed by a
growing number of petitions and subsequent
conversions between 1979 and 1982.
Additional legislation was passed in 1975
and 1976 to supplement the LRA. Act 184
(1975) required that at the termination of a
lease, the lessor compensate the lessee for
unremoved on-site improvements at fair mar-
ket value. This provision applied to existing
and future leases.
24 Act 185 (1975) estab-
lished effective controls on land rents at lease
renegotiation. Act 242 (1976) provided for
appraiser determination of a part of the com-
pensation for the leased fee as the discounted
present value of those controlled rents. These
acts further reduced the attractiveness of
leasehold developments.
In 1979 the Bishop Estate contested the
constitutionality of the Land Reform Act in
state and federal courts. It argued that
government’s power of eminent domain was
not being used to acquire land for a public
purpose. Instead, it was being used to trans-
fer land from one private party to another.
The Estate alleged in federal court that this
action violated the Fifth Amendment’s Pub-
lic Use ClauseÐªnor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compen-
sationº. In 1979, the Hawaii Federal District
Court ruled that the taking was for a constitu-
tionally permissible public purpose.
25 In
1983, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed on the public use issue.
26 In 1984,
the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that the law did not violate the United States
Constitution.
27 Justice O’Connor wrote that
using the State’s eminent domain power to
ªreduce the perceived social and economic
evils of a land oligopolyº was indeed consist-
ent with a public purpose.
28 At the state level,
the First Circuit Court upheld the Act’s con-
stitutionality, and this decision was af® rmed
by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in 1985.
29
The various court decisions affected lease-
hold’ s rate of decline. Thirty per cent of
the 23 400 conversions (as of September
1991) occurred in 1979±82. After the Ninth
Circuit ruled the LRA was unconstitutional,
conversions slowed, comprising only 4 perURBAN LAND REFORM IN HAWAII 1007
cent of the 23 400 conversions in 1983±85.
Following the US and Hawaii Supreme
Court decisions, conversions in 1986±90
comprised 57 per cent of the total conver-
sions, and the Bishop Estate ceased making
leasehold development agreements. By 1991
new leasehold homes from prior developer
agreements had stopped coming onto the
market.
3.2. Why Did the Leasehold System Decline?
There are three major explanations for the
decline of the leasehold system: political
concern about land concentration; rent-seek-
ingÐi.e. lessees’ pursuit of wealth through
the political process;
30 and tax minimisation
by lessors and lessees.
Ideology and rent-seeking . The political his-
tory of land reform in Hawaii has been care-
fully documented by Cooper and Daws
(1985). From 1901 until 1954, the Republi-
cans, who counted among their members
some of the largest landowners in Hawaii,
controlled both the Territorial House and
Senate, usually with large majorities. The
Republican Party was dominated by an eth-
nic coalition of Caucasians and Hawaiians.
All sugar and pineapple plantations as well
as virtually all major businesses in Hawaii
were owned by the Caucasian minority.
While the power of the Republican party was
leavened by Democratic governors appointed
by Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt and Tru-
man, DemocratsÐwhose rank and ® le were
comprised mostly of Asian-AmericansÐ® rst
became competitive in state elections in 1948
and dominant only after 1962. The Demo-
cratic Party made the practice of residential
leasing stemming from Hawaii’s concen-
trated land ownership a political issue. As
early as 1949, Democrats started introducing
bills in the legislature that would have forced
lessors to sell their residential fee interests to
their lessees. It took 18 years before the
landmark 1967 land reform bill was passed.
Cooper and Daws (1985, p. 414) suggest
two possible explanations for passage of the
LRA in 1967; ideology and rent-seeking
First, consider the ideological explanation. It
has been previously indicated that land re-
form (dissipation of concentrated ownership)
was a central, ideologically based plank in
the Democratic platform. On the other hand,
Republican politicians generally opposed
government regulation and interference with
private property rights. On these ideological
grounds, Republicans would be expected to
oppose the land reform bill.
Alternatively, consider the rent-seeking
explanation. Lessees were the sole economic
bene® ciaries of the LRA. It essentially
modi® ed leasehold contracts to provide les-
sees with a free option to buy their land at a
legally speci® ed price. Purchase could poten-
tially avoid: future rent increases; diminished
ability to borrow against the property to-
wards the end of the lease; and surrender of
improvements at its termination.
The largest concentrations of lessees were
relatively af¯ uent residents in East and
Windward Oahu. These predominantly lease-
hold neighbourhoods were represented by
Republican legislators. If the motivation for
the 1967 law was rent-seeking, these Repub-
licans would have joined the majority of
Democrats in voting for the bill. Alterna-
tively, if the motivation was ideological, they
would have voted against the bill.
Cooper and Daws (1985, p. 431) found
that the House of Representatives voting pat-
tern was contrary to the rent-seeking expla-
nation and consistent with the ideological
explanation. Seven of the eight representa-
tives from East and Windward Honolulu
voted against the LRA, and all seven were
Republicans. Six of the seven were re-elected
in the subsequent election; the seventh did
not run for re-election.
On the other hand, the pattern in the Sen-
ate was contrary to the ideological expla-
nation and consistent with the rent-seeking
explanation. All seven senators representing
East and Windward Oahu supported the bill,
and four of them were Republican. One of
the four was defeated in the subsequent elec-
tion.
The mixed voting pattern of Republican
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see constituents suggests that ideology was
an important motivation within the Republi-
can as well as the Democratic party, and that
the present value of economic bene® ts from
lease-to-fee conversion was insuf® cient for
the self-interest of Republicans to dominate
party principles. In 1967, most of the leases
were only a few years old. The present value
of avoiding long-deferred rent increases, bor-
rowing restrictions and the surrender of im-
provements was small. The weakness of
support for the rent-seeking argument is
con® rmed by the authors’ examination of
concurrent news reports and legislative testi-
mony: no evidence was found of lessee
in¯ uence on the legislation.
In 1975 and 1976, the impetus for land
reform dramatically shifted to rent-seeking.
In 1975, the Legislature (Act 186) reaf® rmed
the state’s policy of condemnation to transfer
the leased fee. What is more revealing, the
Legislature passed three previously men-
tioned laws, each having the effect of trans-
ferring wealth from lessors to lessees. Act
184 required lessors to compensate lessees at
market value for on-site improvements at the
termination of the lease. Act 185 established
rent controls on renegotiated leases. Act 242
in 1976 speci® ed a method of appraisal to be
used in the determination of the price of the
leased fee interestÐ a method favourable to
the lessees.
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The 1975 and 1976 voting pattern was
clearly consistent with rent-seeking. In the
Senate, all four of the Republicans represent-
ing East and Windward Oahu joined the
other Senators in unanimously passing all
four bills. None of the four Senators was
defeated in the subsequent election. In the
House, where votes in favour of the four bills
were near-unanimous, all eight Republicans
representing East and Windward Oahu voted
for the four bills. Only one of the eight was
defeated in the subsequent election.
What conditions prompted the transition to
a more transparent rent-seeking environ-
ment? First, the number of lessees increased
signi® cantly between 1967 (about 14 600
lessees) and 1975 (about 22 000 lessees),
thereby increasing their potential voting
power.
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Secondly, the number of lessees with con-
tracts nearing rent renegotiation increased
between 1967 and 1975. Voter propensity to
participate in the political process depends
not only upon the costs of gathering and
processing information but also on the
wealth at stake. As the date of rent renegoti-
ation and higher rent payments neared, the
present value of future higher rent payments
increased. Thus, lessees had increased incen-
tives to vote, lobby or make political contri-
butions to reduce future rents.
Thirdly, the rents available for capture in-
creased substantially between 1967 and
1975.
33 Consider a lessee in 1967 owning a
home on land leased in 1957. The lease
would not renegotiate until 1987 and would
not expire until 2012. In¯ ation had been low
and predictable; real land rents had in-
creased, but renegotiation was still 20 years
ahead. Between 1967 and 1975 the situation
changed dramatically. A highly regulated
land supply coupled with increased demand
produced further increases in real land rents.
In¯ ation, much of it unexpected, rose during
this period, pushing up nominal land rents. In
1975, renegotiation would take place in only
12 years. Lessees were becoming aware not
only of the dif® culties in selling property as
renegotiation neared, but also of the substan-
tial increases in lease rents.
34 Given the in-
creased present value of the economic rents
at stake, individuals had greater incentives to
modify the 1967 LRA to capture a share of
the increased economic rents.
Fourthly, the structure of the ® xed-rent
leasehold contract also implies a substantial
rent hike at renegotiation even in the absence
of unexpected in¯ ation or real increases in
the price of land. In an economic environ-
ment with persistent long-term in¯ ation, the
leasehold contract has the same payment
structure as a long-term mortgage. The ® xed
lease rent in a long-term contract exceeds the
spot market rent in initial periods and is
lower than the spot market rent in later peri-
ods. At renegotiation, the ® xed lease rent
must be raised not just to the spot marketURBAN LAND REFORM IN HAWAII 1009
lease rent, but to a higher, above-spot market
rent to compensate for the effects of expected
in¯ ation.
35 In the mid 1970s, the approaching
rent renegotiations and expectations of sharp
increases in contract rents triggered lessee
rent-seeking. The impetus for such political
action would have been much weaker had the
original leases incorporated small annual rent
increases or indexed rents. Such increases
were rejected by mortgage lenders and were
forbidden by the FHA. The absence of an-
nual CPI adjustments (not to mention real
rent adjustments) along with the site
speci® city of improvements implied impend-
ing one-time rent increases with present val-
ues large enough to cover the costs of
political activity.
The transition from ideological politics to
rent-seeking owed much to changes in the
economic environment during the mid 1970s.
Nonetheless, it must be recognised that the
politics of ideology laid the foundation for
the politics of rent-seeking. The ideologically
based LRA provided the mechanism which,
with a few important alterations, became a
vehicle for redistribution wealth. Essentially,
the success of the politics of ideology re-
duced the cost of transferring wealth. Politi-
cians continued using ideological rhetoric,
but their actions focused on redistributing
economic rents.
Tax minimisation. In the discussion of the
rise of leasehold, a large role was assigned to
taxes. Below, it is shown how changes in tax
rates and IRS policy contributed to the fall of
leasehold.
First, average marginal income tax rates
applicable to most home-owners increased
after 1975.
36 These changes increased home-
owners’ tax bene® ts of fee ownership rela-
tive to leasing, as mortgage interest payments
on the fee purchase were tax deductible,
whereas lease rents were not. Secondly, new
and recontracted lease rents increased after
1975.
37 The higher lease rents increased the
effect on home-owners of the post-1975 in-
crease in tax rates on ordinary income. A
third change occurred in 1979 when the IRS
established a blanket exemption from taxes
on leased fee sales by the Bishop Estate.
Prior to 1979 the IRS had conducted case-by-
case audits on all types of land sales by
estates to determine liability and tax status ex
post.
38 The fourth change was a decrease in
the highest bracket marginal tax rates appli-
cable to the estates.
39 The fall in rates re-
duced the liabilities associated with dealer
status. This should have reduced the estates’
incentives to retain leased fee or fee land
holdings given the reduced cost associated
with possible IRS reclassi® cation as a dealer.
It has been argued above that leasehold
was an artifact of federal tax laws governing
large concentrated landholdings and of legal
rules on the investments of charitable trusts.
By minimising the expected tax liabilities of
landowners and the legal liabilities of the
trustees of dynastic trusts, leasehold in-
creased returns to landowners and trustees.
While leasehold conferred substantial
bene® ts on landowners, it was an institution
that also generated substantial transaction
costs for the two contracting parties. Com-
pared to a fee-simple purchase of the land
and house, a leasehold contact involved
higher transaction costs.
Most of the additional transaction costs are
incurred at renegotiation. Determining the
new lease rent is a costly process. If a lease-
hold home is part of a large leasehold hous-
ing tract, transaction prices on comparable
land may be unavailable. The presence of
home-owner-® nanced site-speci® c assets in-
creases the cost of determining the price of
the unimproved land. Once the price of the
land is determined, the two parties must still
agree on the rate or return on the asset. If the
two parties are unable to agree on a new
lease rent, a board of three appraisers deter-
mines the rent. Such costs do not exist when
a land-house package is purchased in fee
simple. Substantial costs are usually incurred
by both buyer and seller prior to purchase to
determine the attributes of and market valu-
ation of the asset. Such costs are, however,
also incurred when a house on leasehold land
is purchased. Given that the lease must also
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stand leasehold institutions, transactions
costs prior to sale are also likely to be higher
under leasehold.
Additional costs borne by the lessee re-
duce the lessee’s willingness to pay lease
rent. Because of this, the lessor tends to
reduce the rent to compensate the lessee for
transaction costs that are not offset by
bene® ts to the lessee from the leasehold con-
tract. Although the increased transactions
costs produce a smaller stream of gross rev-
enues to lessors, the bene® ts from reducing
tax liabilities and decreasing legal liability
may produce a higher net stream of revenues.
As documented above, changes in IRS tax
policy and federal tax rates after 1982 sub-
stantially reduced the tax saving accruing
from leasehold land holdings. Thus the
higher transaction costs of leasehold may no
longer have generated corresponding
bene® ts. Setting aside additional consider-
ations, such as the land retention clause in
Princess Bishop’s will, estate trustees have
had increased incentives to dismantle an in-
stitution that generates additional costs with-
out corresponding bene® ts.
4. Conclusion
It has been argued that the Campbell and
Bishop wills which advised against land
sales, the prudent man rule which further
discouraged trustees of dynastic estates from
undertaking risky investments in favour of
land retention, the distortionary federal in-
come tax code, and Native Hawaiian oppo-
sition to Bishop Estate land sales were major
factors behind the rise of residential land
leasing Hawaii.
The basic problem with long-term lease
contracts is that they are exposed to rent-
seeking by both parties when there are large,
unexpected changes in the asset’s price. In
Hawaii, land prices rose much faster than
anticipated between 1960 and 1990. Thus
residential lessees with ® xed rents estab-
lished prior to this period gained windfall
pro® ts, while lessors were entitled by con-
tract to reap the windfall pro® ts following
rent redetermination. Not surprisingly, as
more and more contracts came up for
rent redetermination, home-owners sought
governmental intervention to break their con-
tracts to keep the windfalls. Lessors, on the
other hand, preferred to exercise the terms of
the existing contracts. Lessee efforts pre-
vailed and weakened lessor incentives to pre-
serve the leasehold system. After less than 50
years, the largest experiment with private
residential leaseholds in the US is being dis-
mantled.
Hawaii is not the only failed experiment
with private leasehold residential develop-
ment in the US. The Irvine Company’ s ex-
periment with leasehold residential
development in Orange County, California,
resulted in a similar outcome. In Irvine and
surrounding communities, the terms of the
leasehold contracts (set in the 1960s) were
similar to those in Hawaii with initial rents
® xed for 25±30 years. When the ® rst leases
came up for renegotiations in the late 1970s,
rents increased by as much as 3233 per cent.
The home-owners ® led a class action suit
charging that the Company was gouging.
Organised lessee opposition to the Company
further threatened its other commercial de-
velopments (Fortune Magazine, 14 Novem-
ber 1983, pp. 90±102).
In 1983, the Irvine Company agreed to sell
the fee interests to most of the 4000 lessees
electing to purchase. Lessees who chose not
to purchase were offered new 55-year
amended leases with annual rents indexed to
the Consumer Price Index. Annual rent in-
creases were limited to 8 per cent, with
in¯ ation in excess of 8 per cent recaptured in
future years (Sunday Star Bulletin and Ad-
vertiser, 24 November 1992, p. H-3). As in
Hawaii, rent-seeking by the lessees success-
fully prompted land reform in Orange
County, California, and prompted the dis-
mantling of Orange County’ s leasehold sys-
tem.
Leasehold residential housing also exists
in other countries. In most cases a govern-
ment leases publicly-owned land to residents.
In Canberra, Australia, the national govern-
ment is a monopoly lessor, since all the land
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Lease rents were ® xed for 20 years and then
revised every 10 years, ªset at ® ve per cent
of the estimated market value at the time of
revisionº (Neutze, 1989, p. 195). Land rents
were abolished in 1971 during a by-election
for a Canberra seat in the national parlia-
ment, and the national government has indi-
cated that residential leases will be renewed
without additional payments. Thus, leasehold
tenure is now virtually identical to freehold
tenure.
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By contrast, in Vancouver, Canada, the
municipal government leases some land for
residential use, but is a small player in a
competitive housing market dominated by
fee-simple ownership. Public residential
leaseholds in Vancouver have been relatively
problem-free. This can be explained by the
lengthy lease terms (99 years) and low ® xed
lease rents which are prepaid for the entire
period of the lease.
However, ground leases eventually expire.
Experience with public residential leaseholds
demonstrates that government leaseholds do
not preclude rent-seeking activities. Pugh
(1991, p. 329) noted that in Delhi, India,
public leaseholds may have encouraged il-
legal bargaining between public of® cials and
leaseholders. Public leasehold residential de-
velopments impose additional administrative
costs on governments. And it may also be
politically dif® cult for municipal govern-
ments to persuade the relatively wealthy and
politically in¯ uential lessees to vacate the
land at the end of the lease.
The analysis presented here has three
broad implications. First, it is dif® cult to
design and enforce a long-term residential
leasehold contract that achieves ef® cient re-
sults. In retrospect, had the leasehold con-
tracts in Hawaii and Irvine speci® ed annual
rent adjustments tied to the CPI instead of
® xed rent contracts with renegotiation, the
economic incentives might not have been
large enough many years later to cover the
lessees’ costs of political activity to enact
land reform legislation enabling them to
break their contracts. Institutional con-
straintsÐ speci® cally, mortgage lenders’ re-
luctance to accept and the FHA’s prohibition
of annual rent adjustmentsÐ ruled out in-
dexed rents in Hawaii from the 1950s to the
1970s when many leaseholds were being de-
veloped.
By contrast, the amended Irvine leasehold
contracts contain a provision for annual rent
indexation. In Palm Springs, California, a
major leasehold residential development on
Agua Caliente Indian Reservation land also
speci® es rent adjustment every 5 years using
the CPI, with typical leases running 65 years
(Nakamura, 1989). Indexation of rents may
lessen destructive rent-seeking activities on
the part of lessors and lessees but is unlikely
to eliminate them. Land values can rise or
fall at a much faster pace than overall
in¯ ation, and since both parties of the con-
tract cannot accurately anticipate the change
and adjust the initial base rent accordingly,
there is still the likelihood that opportunistic
behaviour will occur even with indexation.
Secondly, the rise of leasehold was largely
the unintended result of the interaction be-
tween the federal tax code and the incentives
faced by the trustees of large dynastic es-
tates. In this case income taxation did more
than distort individual choice within a given
institutional arrangementÐit distorted the
choice of institutional arrangements. Tra-
ditional analysis of the deadweight losses
from taxation takes the institutional structure
as given and assumes that individual choices
are distorted within this ® xed institutional
framework. In most instances this assump-
tion is appropriate, as individuals often ® nd it
less costly to adjust choice variables more
directly under their control than to organise
politically to adjust institutional variables. In
this case, the threat of IRS `dealer’
classi® cation and high marginal tax rates in-
creased the bene® ts to landowners of adopt-
ing a new land market institution. In sum,
leasehold in Hawaii is a case study of the
potential for taxation to affect institutional
choice as well as more immediate individual
choice variables.
Thirdly, land reform legislation estab-
lished to improve the land markets enables
particular interest groups or coalitions of in-
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has been well established in the case of
regulatory commissions (Stigler, 1971; Noll,
1989). Although ideological forces provided
the main push for the 1967 LRA, the land
reform process was captured by rent-seeking
lessees in the 1970s. Successful land reform
legislation must take into account future rent-
seeking in its original design or ultimately it
may not achieve its original objectives.
In Hawaii the redistribution of land was
accompanied by the redistribution of wealth.
Urban land reform in Hawaii redistributed
wealth by imposing rent ceilings and man-
dating compensation by lessors to lessees for
® xed improvements at the end of the lease
(La Croix and Rose, 1995). Wealth redistri-
bution via land reform is not uncommon.
Rural land reform in developing countries
has occasionally redistributed wealth to poor
tenant farmers. However, urban land reform
in Hawaii redistributed wealth to leasehold
home-owners, an already wealthy group. The
losers of wealth were Native Hawaiians
served by the Bishop Estate’s education pro-
grammes. In this case, rent-seeking not only
dissipated economic rents, but also was at
odds with an equitable distribution of wealth.
Few in-depth examinations of residential
leasehold developments exist, and more re-
search is clearly required before general con-
clusions can be drawn. However, this case
study of leasehold in Hawaii and the brief
examination of other residential leasehold
developments have raised serious questions
concerning the long-term viability of residen-
tial leasehold tenure. In sum, this analysis
points to the conclusion that the disadvan-
tages of private or public residential lease-
hold development tend to outweigh its
potential advantages.
Notes
1. In the Paci® c, only New Zealand, Australia,
Guam and Hawaii permit land to be sold to
non-natives. According to Ward (1993) the
desire to protect indigenous landowners from
the loss of their land was a feature of col-
onial policy in many Paci® c islands. In
Hawaii there was a massive sale of land to
foreigners after private property was estab-
lished in 1848 and the legislature approved
the sale of land to foreigners in 1850. See La
Croix and Roumasset (1990) and Kame`elei-
hiwa (1992) for discussions of the origins of
the Great Mahele.
2. Leasehold actually had a foothold at the turn
of the century. The Report of the US Labor
Commissioner on Hawaii (1902) surveyed
225 families about their housing tenure. Of
the 36 families who owned their homes, 12
families leased the land.
3. The ® gures include tenant-occupied as well
as owner-occupied leasehold units. After
Harold Castle’s death in 1967, his holdings
were left to the Castle Estate.
4. This was especially true in the late 1970s and
early 1980s when housing prices were rising
rapidly in the US. See, for instance, Booth
(1980) and Wall Street Journal, 24 March
1980, p. 42).
5. The Bishop Estate’s standard lease runs 55
years, but there is some variation in lease
length across different properties (see Eco-
nomics Research Associates (1969, pp. VI-
2±VI-8)). Prior to 1940, most leases were 30
years in length. From 1946±52, the prevail-
ing term conformed to the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) standard of 50 years.
A 55-year lease became the standard in 1952
to conform to FHA ® nancing requirements.
6. In 1975, the median lease rent on existing
single-family dwellings in Hawaii was $245
per year and the mean lease rent was $512.
The data were taken from the 1975 US
Of® ce of Economic Opportunity census up-
date survey for Hawaii. It is the only census-
type survey which differentiates housing
tenure as leasehold or fee simple. A com-
plete analysis of lease rent determination
requires an analysis of the effect of taxes on
lessors as well as lessees. For an extended
discussion of the impact of federal tax law
on the demand for leaseholding housing, see
Fry and Mak (1984).
7. By contrast, in the early 1970s, the Bishop
Estate’s policy was to set rents at 4.5 per
cent of the land’s value. See Honolulu Ad-
vertiser, 1 August 1973, p. II-A-7.
8. That is, in a typical 55-year lease, the ® rst 30
years comprise the ® xed-rent period. During
the remaining 25 years, the law allows addi-
tional rent adjustment in the 45th year.
9. In compliance, the trustees established the
Kamehameha Schools in 1887.
10. It was ® rst formulated by the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Harvard College v.
Amory. Mass. (9 Pick) 446, 461 (1830).
11. Estate of James Campbell, Decsd. 42 HawaiiURBAN LAND REFORM IN HAWAII 1013
586 (1959); Hyde v. Smith, 11 Hawaii 535
(1899); and Dowsett v. Hawaiian Trust Co.,
47 Hawaii 577 (1965)
12. State law sets compensation of the Bishop
Estate trustees collectively at expenses plus 2
per cent of gross revenue and 2.5 per cent on
the sale of assets.
13. Some estate trustees inform us that they were
not explicitly aware of the prudent man rule.
Rather, they relied on their own interpreta-
tions of the Campbell and Bishop wills call-
ing for protection of the estate corpus. Other
trustees were, however, aware that their en-
tire personal wealth was at risk.
14. Hawaii state taxes are generally patterned
after federal taxes, albeit with lower rates.
Thus, the same arguments that we shall set
forth regarding the effects of federal taxes
apply to state taxes as well, with the latter
effects being smaller in magnitude.
15. In principle, it was possible to transfer title
without incurring a capital gains tax. An
estate or corporation could defer federal
capital gains taxes inde® nitely by exchang-
ing land for `like-kind’ properties under Sec-
tion 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. The
method has been available since 1922. As a
general rule, it was so complex and costly to
arrange for timely exchange that only one of
the large estates, the Campbell Estate, has
employed exchanges to any signi® cant ex-
tent, and then only since the mid 1970s. The
Bishop Estate has made only slight use of
Section 1031.
16. The frequency or regularity of sales was also
critical to IRS classi® cation of non-charitable
estates. As occasional sellers, the Campbell
Estate and Kaneohe Ranch would be treated
as non-dealers and taxed on net sales rev-
enues at the capital gains rate. However, as
frequent sellers, they would be classi® ed as
dealers and taxed at the ordinary income
rate.
17. Initially, the intent was to sell them in lease-
hold, but the FHA would not insure them.
Thus, potential buyers could not obtain mort-
gage ® nancing on homes built on leasehold
lots. Since the Bishop Estate could not sell
them in leasehold, it sold them in fee simple.
Subsequently, major landowners went to
Washington, DC, and worked out standard
(and similar) lease forms with the FHA and
Veterans Administration (VA) along with
agreements that these agencies would insure
mortgages on leasehold homes. Bishop Es-
tate Oswald Stender believes that the two
standard forms (later reduced to one) and the
importance of FHA and VA mortgage in-
surance were important in accelerating the
rise of leasehold. Ninety per cent of residen-
tial leases provided by lessors since the
1960s have used these forms.
18. Interview with Bishop Estate trustee Oswald
Stender, 30 August 1994.
19. Some sources indicate 715 additional leased
fee sales by Bishop Estate. Regardless, there
were relatively few sales following the IRS
warning. Personal conversation of Wesley
Hillendahl, former chief economist at Bank
of Hawaii, with James Mak. The Bishop
Estate may have sold land during this period
to meet operating expenses of the Kame-
hameha School.
20. A Campbell Estate trustee can recall only
two sales: 200 acres to an oil company, and
65 acres to a residential developer.
21. Castle & Cooke, did not develop any resi-
dential leasehold property.
22. Data on the number of leasehold homes dur-
ing the 1970s are unavailable. Vargha (1964,
p. 10) stated that in 1963 there were 15 342
leasehold lots in Honolulu. According to
Wesley Hillendahl, from 1964 through 1975
there were 9880 additional leasehold lots
developed on Bishop Estate land. The Da-
mon Estate sold all of its 1000 leased fees in
the mid 1960s; the Bishop Estate sold a total
of 1300 leased fees in 1966, 1967 and 1972.
These ® gures are the basis for the 22 000
maximum estimate in the mid 1970s. Loca-
tions Inc. (1992, p. 19) reports that by Sep-
tember 1991 about 28 000 leasehold homes
had been built and 23 400 had been con-
verted to fee simple, leaving 4600 in lease-
hold.
23. There were both technical and philosophical
reasons why Governor Burns refused to im-
plement the 1967 LRA. The technical ¯ aw in
the LRA was that it required the state to
purchase an entire tract, resell to those les-
sees willing and able to buy, and become
landlords to the remaining lessees. Burns did
not want to use state funds to become a
landlord to wealthy lessees. The matter
rested until George Ariyoshi became Gover-
nor in 1974. See Cooper and Daws, 1985, ch.
13.
24. Anthony v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 69 Haw. 112,
736 P.2d 55 (1987) overturned the retroac-
tive provisions of the law.
25. Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F.Supp. 62 (1979).
26. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (1983).
27. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984).
28. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
29. 704 P.2d 888 (Hawaii 1985).
30. Rent-seeking activities use resources to re-
distribute wealth and may have positive orSUMNER J. LA CROIX ET AL. 1014
negative consequences on economic welfare.
See Roumasset and La Croix (1988).
31. Midkiff v. Tom, 471 F.Supp. 871 (1979).
32. Stigler (1971) and others have emphasised
that larger groups have higher costs of organ-
ising for political action due to free-riding
problems. Moreover, inclusion of more indi-
viduals in the majority group may result in
smaller per capita transfers and may dull the
incentive of individual members of the group
to vote or contribute to lobbying efforts. This
analysis presumes, however, that a ® xed
amount of economic rent is being reassigned
to a larger group of claimants, thereby lead-
ing to smaller per capita shares. The analysis
does not apply to the growing number of
lessees in Hawaii, as each additional lessee
brings additional economic rent to the politi-
cal process for redistribution.
33. Price appreciation data on land are unavail-
able. Indirect evidence, based on single-fam-
ily home price appreciation as reported by
the US decennial censii, indicates that home
prices in Honolulu accelerated after 1970.
Downs (1983) reports mean price apprecia-
tion of 5.34 per cent per year between 1950
and 1960, 5.09 per cent per year between
1960 and 1970, and 13.02 per cent between
1970 and 1980. Corresponding rates of in-
crease for the Honolulu consumer price in-
dex (CPI-U) were 2.58 per cent, 2.89 per
cent and 7.18 per cent per year. By compari-
son with the census data, John Child and Co.,
a Honolulu appraisal ® rm, analysed resale
prices of single-family homes in 20 Hon-
olulu sub-divisions between 1967 and 1980.
John Child (1980, 1981) found that the ap-
preciation of a carefully selected sample of
homes during this period averaged 10.75 per
cent. The range of appreciation across sub-
divisions was 9±13.7 per cent. During the
same period, the Honolulu CPI-U increased
at an annual compound rate of 6.6 per cent.
34. Mortgage lenders would typically not make
mortgage loans when the lease was due for
either renegotiation or expiration within 10
years.
35. One of the earliest rent negotiations was the
1964 rent adjustment for Portlock Road
homes located on Bishop Estate land in
Hawaii Kai. Rents jumped by 300±600 per
cent for the ® rst 15 years and another 20±25
per cent for the ® nal 15 years. See Honolulu
Advertiser, (p. A-1, A-2, 5 February 1964).
In 1971 a small sub-division on Bishop Es-
tate land in Kailua witnessed a 624 per cent
increase for the ® nal 26 years of a 48-year
lease. See Honolulu Advertiser, 23 Septem-
ber 1971, p. A-12. In 1976±77, the Waialae±
Kahala Tract A lease rents jumped from
$250 per year to nearly $3000 per year, or an
increase of over 1000 per cent (Cooper and
Daws, 1985, p. 424). In the early 1990s
condominium lease rents typically increased
by 1000±1200 per cent at renegotiation. See
Sunday Star Bulletin and Advertiser (24
March 1991, pp. A-1 and A-11).
36. Barro and Sahasakul (1986) showed that av-
erage marginal federal tax rates ¯ uctuated in
the 21±26 per cent range in the years 1960±
75 and then increased to 29±31 per cent in
1978±82.
37. Although no published time-series on con-
tracted rents, leasehold conversion prices and
fee simple prices are available, a few obser-
vations and some indirect evidence from a
series on home price appreciation in 1960±
80 suggest that rising rents and prices
throughout this period created tax incentives
that helped to fuel the fall of leasehold
(Downs and Child, 1980, 1981).
38. Despite this change, uncertainty persisted in
regard to the Bishop Estate’s fee simple sales
and all other owners’ sales of leased fee and
fee-simple properties. There remained a
strong fear of dealer reclassi® cation.
39. From the end of World War II until 1964, the
highest federal marginal tax rate on ordinary
income was 91 per cent. From 1964 until
1981, the highest rate was 70 per cent. Be-
tween 1982 and 1984, it was gradually re-
duced to 50 per cent. The 1986 Tax Reform
Act reduced the highest rate to 28 per cent.
Between 1990 and 1993, the highest rate
increased to 39.6 per cent. Despite the recent
increases, rates are still much lower than in
1981 or 1964.
40. The two types of tenure ªdiffer in that resi-
dential leases can be converted to non-resi-
dential use only by application to the
Supreme Court and after payment of a 50 per
cent betterment chargeº (Neutze, 1989, p.
197). Neutze’s article also contains an in-
sightful analysis of the complex residential
leasehold system in Stockholm, Sweden.
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